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Solidarity in Overlapping Insurance Coverage:
Rethinking Hoefly
Alex Robertson*
In for a penny, in for a pound—solidary obligors are treated as one.
As between themselves, a payment to a creditor by one solidary obligor
relieves the others toward that creditor.1 Interruption of prescription as to
one solidary obligor interrupts as to all.2 The effects of solidarity are
powerful and have always been clear, but deciding to whom solidarity
applies has proven cumbersome for Louisiana courts.3
A plain reading of the Louisiana Civil Code suggests that solidarity
arises only when the parties or the law clearly express an intent to bind
obligors in solido.4 The Louisiana Supreme Court in Hoefly v. Government
Employees Insurance Company5 established a three-pronged test whereby
courts could more flexibly invoke the doctrine of solidarity arising from
the law6 to save a plaintiff’s claim from prescription.7 The Hoefly Court’s
holding, however—that a victim’s under- or uninsured motorist (“UM”)
insurer and a tortfeasor were solidarily bound so that prescription was
interrupted as to both8—perhaps unwittingly expanded the application of
solidarity.9

Copyright 2017, by ALEX ROBERTSON.
* Associate Attorney at Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore LLC. For her
instruction, which was indispensable to the preparation of this Article, the author
thanks Professor Melissa T. Lonegrass. The author would also like to thank his
wife Felicia and his grandparents, Carey and Shirley, for their unwavering love
and support. The author dedicates this Article to the memory of his father, Andrew
K. Robertson, who instilled in him the ethics and curiosity necessary to undertake
and complete this arduous process.
1. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1794 (2017).
2. Id. art. 3503.
3. See generally Bruce Schewe, Tilting Against Windmills: A Solidary
Rejoinder, 41 LA. L. REV. 1279 (1981) [hereinafter Tilting Against Windmills].
4. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1796.
5. 418 So. 2d 575 (La. 1982).
6. Id. at 577 (“Under Civil Code Article 2091, ‘[t]here is an obligation in
solido on the part of the debtors, when they are all obliged to the same thing, so
that each may be compelled for the whole, and when the payment which is made
by one of them, exonerates the others toward the creditor.’ When an obligation
fulfills this definition and contains these ingredients, the obligation is in solido.”).
7. See discussion infra Part I.B.3.a.
8. Hoefly, 418 So. 2d at 580.
9. See discussion infra Part I.C.
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Although it granted future courts a certain amount of flexibility to
summon the doctrine of solidarity on an ad hoc basis,10 the Hoefly test
created unanticipated and perhaps undesirable consequences. Less than a
year after Hoefly, Justice Blanche criticized the Hoefly Court for
attempting to “salvage[] a particular plaintiff's claim from prescription by
invoking the doctrine of solidarity” without considering what other, “less
palatable effects the application of . . . solidarity would have upon future
claimants.”11 Blanche’s criticisms foreshadowed a line of tort cases in
which an insurer’s coverage obligation overlaps with either a tortfeasor or
another insurer’s liability, sparking litigation over whether parties are
entitled to a credit for payments made under the policy.12 A study of this
line of cases reveals that the application of the Hoefly test suffers from
circular reasoning, irreconcilably conflicts with other Civil Code
principles and Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence, is no longer
needed to serve the purposes for which Louisiana adopted solidarity, and
is easily manipulated.
Part I of this Article analyzes the relevant Louisiana Civil Code
articles relating to when solidarity should apply, Louisiana courts’
interpretations of those articles leading up to Hoefly, and the expansion of
the Hoefly test in the insurance context. Part II articulates four possible
defects in the Hoefly test and illustrates each defect with a discussion of
post-Hoefly jurisprudence. Finally, Part III suggests that courts analyze
solidarity arising from the law based on a plain reading of the Civil Code,
requiring the legislature to decide expressly—guided by public policy—
which obligors are solidarily bound.
I. LOUISIANA’S INTERPRETATION OF SOLIDARITY ARISING FROM THE
LAW AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE INSURANCE CONTEXT
Analyzing only the text of the Civil Code articles concerning solidarity
lends itself to multiple interpretations of when solidarity arises from the law—
that is, situations in which parties have not contracted for a solidary
relationship. Indeed, Louisiana courts vacillated over the proper interpretation
until Hoefly established the now-operative three-pronged test. The Hoefly
decision, however, inadvertently portended the extension of solidarity’s
application in the insurance “credit cases.”

10. See SAUL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 7.61, in 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 142 (2d ed. 2001).
11. Carona v. State Farm Ins. Co., 458 So. 2d 1275, 1280 (La. 1984)
(Blanche, J., concurring).
12. See discussion infra Part I.C.
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A. Basic Civil Code Principles
A plain reading of the Louisiana Civil Code suggests that solidarity
arises only from a clear expression in legislation. Articles 1794 and 1796
address this issue. Of these, only article 1796 speaks directly to when
solidarity arises.13 Article 1796 articulates two distinct principles: first,
that solidarity is never presumed; and second, that “[a] solidary obligation
arises from a clear expression of the parties’ intent or from the law.”14
Although no Code article delineates the strength of, or what is sufficient
to overcome, the presumption against solidarity, solidarity is clearly the
exception rather than the rule.15 Nevertheless, the second principle of
article 1796—regarding when solidarity “arises”16—suffers from at least
one major ambiguity.
Whether the drafters of article 1796 intended the phrase “clear
expression” to modify only the parties’ intent or both the “parties’ intent”
and “the law”17 is not apparent. For instance, article 3045 states that cosureties are solidarily liable for the obligation of the principal obligor.18
Such is an obvious example of an unambiguous expression of solidarity in
the law. Exactly how clear the legislation has to be is uncertain, but it is
apparent that an obligation may be solidary “though it derives from a
different source for each obligor.”19
The Civil Code also distinguishes an obligation that is solidary for
obligees from an obligation that is solidary for obligors.20 Under article
1794, styled “Solidary obligations for obligors,” an obligation is solidary
for obligors “when each obligor is liable for the whole performance.”21
Article 1794 also states that “[a] performance rendered by one of the
solidary obligors relieves the others of liability toward the obligee.”22
Thus, article 1794’s purpose may be accurately described in one of three
ways: first, by describing only the difference between an obligation that is

13. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1796 (2017).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Hoefly v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575, 581 (La. 1982)
(Blanche, J., dissenting).
16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1796.
17. See LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.66, at 149.
18. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3045.
19. Id. art. 1797.
20. Id. arts. 1790, 1794.
21. Id. art. 1794.
22. Id.
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solidary for the obligors and solidary for the obligees;23 second, by
describing the effects of solidarity for obligors presupposing a finding of
solidarity;24 or third, by setting out elements to determine when an
obligation is solidary for the obligors.25
Reading both articles 1794 and 1796 in pari materia, it might seem
that article 1796 determines when solidarity arises from the law. Not only
does the presumption against solidarity buttress this conclusion, but article
1796 more specifically addresses when solidarity “arises” from the law.26
This interpretation would result in fewer obligations being classified as
solidary, imposing a higher standard when solidarity arises from the law.27
Another plausible in pari materia interpretation of these articles suggests
that article 1794—not article 1796—is determinative of solidarity arising
from the law. Whereas article 1796 speaks of solidarity generally, article 1794
speaks directly to obligations that are solidary for obligors.28 Indeed, this
interpretation of article 1794 focuses on the use of “when” in that article and
interprets what follows as elements or “ingredients”29 of solidarity: “An
obligation is solidary . . . when . . . .”30 Under this interpretation, it would seem
that if the conditions are met, the obligation is solidary for the obligors.
B. Louisiana Courts’ Interpretations of Solidarity Arising from the Law
Louisiana courts have wavered over what articles to apply to determine
when solidarity arose from the law. As late as 1981, scholars lamented that
there was no “ordered doctrine of solidarity,” and few decisions determining
when solidarity arose from the law “reveal[ed] an adequate theoretical
foundation.”31 Generally, courts chose one of three options to make that
determination: first, article 1796’s clear-expression test; second, the
secondary-effects test; and third, the principal-effects test from article
23. Compare id. art. 1790 (“Solidary obligations for obligees”), with id. art.
1794 (“Solidary obligations for obligors”).
24. See Bruce Schewe, Prescribing Solidarity: Contributing to the Indemnity
Dilemma, 41 LA. L. REV. 659, 672–76 (1981) [hereinafter Prescribing Solidarity]
(discussing the then-operative article 2091, the equivalent of article 1794, and the
then-operative article 2093, the equivalent of article 1796).
25. See, e.g., Hoefly v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Company, 418 So. 2d 575, 577 (La. 1982).
26. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1796 (“A solidary obligation arises from a clear
expression of the parties’ intent or from the law.”).
27. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.66, at 149.
28. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1796.
29. See Hoefly, 418 So. 2d at 579.
30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1794.
31. Prescribing Solidarity, supra note 24, at 679.
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1794.32 Ultimately, Louisiana courts settled on the principal-effects test,
which is widely considered to be a liberal interpretation of solidarity.33
1. The Clear-Expression Test
When courts applied the “clear-expression” analysis, the only relevant
inquiry was whether statutory authority expressly prescribed solidarity to
specific obligors.34 Wary of the presumption against solidarity, courts held
that the law deemed obligors bound in solido only when a statute or Code
article spoke to the issue directly.35 For instance, in Cox v. Shreveport
Packing Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court held an employer and his
tortfeasing employee were not solidarily bound, stating: “[T]here is no
provision of our law which expressly renders a master solidarily liable
with his servant for the latter’s wrongdoing.”36 The clear-expression test
resulted in fewer obligations being classified as solidary, and courts over
time slowly backed away from this strict view of solidarity.37
2. The Secondary-Effects Test
The secondary-effects test established that solidarity arose from the
law when the obligation appeared to resemble the secondary effects of
solidarity.38 This standard seems odd because it developed when the law
recognized two types of solidarity: imperfect solidarity—also called in
solidum—and perfect solidarity—also called in solido.39 Similarly, the
effects of solidarity comprised two subtypes: principal and secondary.40
Perfect solidarity carried with it both principal and secondary effects,
while imperfect solidarity carried only the principal effects of solidarity.41
The Louisiana Civil Code recognized primarily two principal effects of
solidarity: first, all obligors are “obliged to the same thing so that each
may be compelled for the whole” obligation; and second, payment made

32. Id. at 677.
33. See Hoefly, 418 So. 2d at 581 (Blanche, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
principal-effects test as amounting to judicial legislation); see also LITVINOFF,
supra note 10, § 7.66, at 149.
34. See Cox v. Shreveport Packing Co., 35 So. 2d 373, 375 (1948).
35. See id. See also Prescribing Solidarity, supra note 24, at 675.
36. Cox, 35 So. 2d at 375.
37. See LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.66, at 149.
38. Tilting Against Windmills, supra note 3, at 1284.
39. Id; see LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.101, at 181–82.
40. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.80, at 168.
41. Tilting Against Windmills, supra note 3, at 1285.
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by one obligor exonerated all others toward the creditor.42 This scheme
recognized that the now-repealed article 2091 set out the principal effects
of solidarity, and all the articles that followed “specif[ied] [the] secondary
characteristics of solidarity.”43 The most hotly litigated secondary effect
of solidarity was that suit against one in solido obligor interrupted
prescription as to all.44 Other secondary effects of solidarity included:
putting one solidary obligor in default puts them all in default and shifts
the risk of loss to the debtors; permitting litigants to sue all solidary
obligors in any parish that is proper for any solidary obligor; and obligors
were provided a right of contribution.45 The secondary-effects test, which
first appeared in the highly criticized Louisiana Supreme Court case
Wooten v. Wimberly,46 vanished after the Louisiana Supreme Court
overturned Wooten in Foster v. Hampton, stating, “[t]he distinction drawn
between perfect and imperfect solidarity is untenable and must be
rejected.”47 Soon thereafter, the Louisiana Legislature followed suit,
removing all references to in solidum liability from the Civil Code in the
1980s.48
3. The Principal-Effects Test
The principal-effects test asks whether the principal effects from Civil
Code article 1796 are present. Under this test, an obligation is solidary
when all three of the following elements are found: first, all obligors are
obligated to the same thing; second, each obligor may be compelled for
the whole; and third, payment made by one exonerates the others toward
the creditor.49 The Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately settled on this
test,50 and it continues to remain in effect.51
Scholars have suggested that this test is a liberal view of solidarity.52
Despite the Civil Code’s presumption against solidarity and its clearexpression requirement, Louisiana courts have used this test to conclude
that obligors are bound in solido, even in the absence of any mention of
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Prescribing Solidarity, supra note 24, at 671, n.104.
Id.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 672–73.
272 So. 2d 303, 305 (La. 1972).
381 So. 2d 789, 791 (La. 1980).
LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.84, at 175.
Id.
Hoefly v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575, 577 (La. 1982).
See discussion infra Part I.C.
LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.66, at 149.
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solidarity in the contract or the legislation that bound the parties.53 Put
another way, “Louisiana courts have adopted a liberal view of solidarity
that arises from the law, which allows them to conclude that multiple
obligors are solidarily bound . . . even when the law that provides that
obligation neither uses the word, nor makes reference to, solidarity.”54
Perhaps the desirability of solidarity’s principal effects can best explain
Louisiana courts’ loose applications of solidarity in certain instances.
a. Liberative Prescription’s Entanglement with Solidarity:
Interpreting the Result in Hoefly
Courts adopted this liberal view of solidarity, at least in part, because of
solidarity’s intertwined relationship with prescription. When prescription is
interrupted against one solidary obligor, it is interrupted as to all solidary
obligors.55 This principle is true regardless of whether the plaintiff named
all of the solidary obligors in the petition or served them.56 Thus, sometimes
courts stretched the limits of solidarity to help the plaintiff gain access to
deeper pockets.57 In one such case, Hoefly v. Government Employees
Insurance Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted a new test for
solidarity—utilizing the three-pronged principal-effects test—to rescue a
plaintiff’s claim from prescription.58 Importantly, to arrive at this
conclusion, the Court had to conclude that a UM insurer and a tortfeasor
were solidarily bound.59 This aspect of the case unwittingly produced
unforeseen consequences in tort cases in which tortfeasors or insurers had
overlapping liability.60
Justice Blanche dissented in Hoefly, sharply criticizing the majority.61
Specifically, he noted that “[i]n all other cases in which legal solidarity
arises, there exists some relationship between the parties who are held
solidarily liable.”62 Reasoning that because “the law” did not create any

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3503 (2017).
56. See id. art. 3503 cmt. b.
57. See, e.g., Carona v. State Farm Ins. Co., 458 So. 2d 1275, 1280 (La. 1984)
(“In Hoefly v. GEICO, this Court salvaged a particular plaintiff's claim from
prescription by invoking the doctrine of solidarity whereby U/M insurers were
deemed solidarily liable with tortfeasors.” (citation omitted)).
58. Hoefly v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575, 576 (La. 1982).
59. Id. at 579.
60. See discussion infra Part II.
61. Hoefly, 418 So. 2d at 581 (Blanche, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
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relationship between the tortfeasors and the UM insurer, the application of
solidarity in Hoefly was “purely [a] creation of the majority.”63 Blanche
buttressed his criticisms with the presumption against solidarity, stating,
“we cannot presume a solidary relationship where none is intended to
exist.”64 Thus, according to Blanche, there must be, at the very least, some
legislative intent to bind obligors solidarily, even if the legislature did not
say it outright.65 Anything else, in his opinion, amounted to “judicial
legislation.”66
b. Immediate Fallout from Hoefly: Justice Blanche’s Concurrence in
Carona
The unanticipated consequences of Hoefly manifested almost immediately.
A year after Hoefly, in Carona v. State Farm Insurance Co.,67 the Louisiana
Supreme Court dealt with a group of consolidated cases in which the trial court
in each case either granted summary judgment or granted an exception of res
judicata in favor of UM carriers because the tort victims settled with the
tortfeasors without expressly reserving rights against the UM carriers.68
The then-operative Civil Code article 2203 provided that when an obligee
remitted a debt against one solidary obligor without expressly reserving
rights against the other, the obligee forfeited the entire obligation.69 Hence,
the Court faced what was perhaps an unforeseen implication from the
Hoefly holding, which had previously held that a UM provider and the
tortfeasor were solidary obligors.70 Eschewing the “technical rule” of
article 2203, the Court, in a feat of interpretive acrobatics, concluded that
the purpose of UM legislation precluded article 2203’s application in that
case.71
The Court unanimously agreed with the result in Carona.72 Concurring
in the result only, Justice Blanche seized an opportunity to reassert and expand
upon his dissent in Hoefly.73 Specifically, he characterized the reasoning in
Hoefly as nothing more than “salvag[ing] a particular plaintiff’s claim from
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
458 So. 2d 1275 (La. 1984).
Id. at 1277.
Id.
Hoefly, 418 So. 2d at 580.
Carona, 458 So. 2d at 1279.
Id.
Id. at 1280.
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prescription by invoking the doctrine of solidarity.”74 According to Justice
Blanche, Carona was an example of the “less palatable effects” caused by
the Court’s loose interpretation in Hoefly.75
Blanche premised his reasoning on the notion “that no solidary
relationship exists between a tortfeasor and the claimant’s U/M carrier.”76
Therefore, it was the blind assertion of Hoefly at the root of the issues in
Carona.77 Blanche, however, did not necessarily disagree with the use of
the principal-effects test per se, but rather the Court’s analysis of whether
obligors are “all obliged to the same thing.”78
Blanche then set out a new method to interpret when obligors are
“obliged to the same thing.”79 Under Blanche’s test, solidarity would seem
to arise between insurers only when expressly legislated or when the
insurers had previously enjoyed a “solidary relationship” with one
another.80 Premising his reasoning on the assertion that solidarity is an
exception to the general rule, under which debts are divided among joint
obligors, Blanche noted that the UM statute “contains no provision which
would allow the U/M carrier” to become solidarily liable with a
tortfeasor.81 The lack of legislation prescribing solidarity coupled with the
presumption against solidarity, militated against the Court cobbling
together a solidary obligation from different areas of the law.82
Blanche also balked at the notion that it is the coextensiveness of the
obligations that makes obligors bound for the same thing.83 Instead,
Blanche preferred the French rule: a plaintiff may look to any solidary
obligor for the whole obligation.84 Expanding upon the definition of
“whole obligation,” Blanche clarified that in France, obligors are
solidarily bound only if the entirety of their obligation is the same
amount.85 Thus, under the majority approach, if two obligors are bound
for “the same thing”—one for up to $50,000 and one for $75,000—the two
are solidarily bound for the $50,000.86 Under Blanche’s rationale,
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1281.
Id.
Id. at 1282.
Id.
See id. at 1282–83.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.

984

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

however, the two cannot be solidarily bound at all because they are not
bound for the “same thing.”87 Followed to its logical conclusion, unless
the amount of the plaintiff’s damages and the policy limits are the exact
equivalent, the law would most likely never bind an insurer and a
tortfeasor in solido.88
C. The Expansion of the Three-Pronged Hoefly Test in the Context of
Insurance
Since Hoefly, solidarity has been a hotly litigated issue in “credit
cases.”89 In those cases, an accident occurs, usually during the course and
scope of employment, and two or more insurers have provided coverage.90
After one of the insurers pays first,91 the other insurer, recognizing that the
plaintiff has already received a payment, files a motion for summary
judgment seeking recognition of a credit reducing its obligation by the
amount the other insurer has already paid.92 The operative theory is that
the two insurers are solidary obligors, and payment by one exonerates the
other toward the creditor.93 The two Louisiana Supreme Court cases that
embraced the application of solidarity in this context—Bellard and
Cutsinger—have made it worthwhile for many insurers to litigate this
issue. Indeed, after Bellard and Cutsinger many appellate courts have
examined solidarity in similar situations, resulting in an incoherent and
confused body of jurisprudence.94
1. Bellard and Cutsinger: Expanding Solidarity in Insurance Cases
In Bellard v. American Central Insurance Co.,95 the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that the UM insurer of a plaintiff’s employer was entitled to a credit
in the amount paid by the employer’s workers’ compensation insurer because
the two were solidarily bound.96 In that case, an employee sustained injuries

87. Id.
88. Id. at 1283.
89. See Musa Rahman, Bellard & Cutsinger: A Review of the Supreme Court
Cases and Their Potential Fallout in Workers’ Compensation, 58 LA. B.J. 374,
375 (2011).
90. See, e.g., Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 980 So. 2d 654, 660 (La. 2008).
91. See, e.g., id.
92. See, e.g., id.
93. See, e.g., id.
94. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
95. Bellard, 980 So. 2d at 654.
96. Id. at 671.
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in a moving vehicle accident during the course and scope of his
employment.97 The plaintiff sued the other driver’s liability insurer, the
other driver, and his employer’s UM insurer.98 The employer’s UM insurer
then filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that the
insurer was entitled to a credit in the amount that workers’ compensation
paid to the plaintiff.99
In holding that the UM insurer was entitled to the credit, the Court first
concluded that the UM insurer and the workers’ compensation carrier were
solidary obligors.100 Applying the three-pronged Hoefly test, the Court
determined that each insurer was liable for the same thing: “certain
elements of tort damage.”101 Accordingly, it did not matter that different
areas of the law created liability and that no legislation expressed an intent
to bind the obligors in solido.102 Next, the Court determined that both
obligors “may be compelled for the whole of their common liability”
because neither was subject to a plea of division.103 Last, the Court
concluded that payment from one exonerated the other because an “injured
employee is not allowed to obtain double recovery on those elements of
damage which are coextensive.”104
Thus, the two insurers were solidary obligors.105 Because solidarity
existed, payment by the workers’ compensation insurer exonerated the
UM insurer toward the plaintiff.106 After concluding that the collateralsource rule did not apply,107 the Court held that the UM insurer was
entitled to a credit in the amount paid by workers’ compensation.108
After Bellard held that the employer’s UM carrier could receive a
credit for payments by the workers’ compensation insurer, the Louisiana
Supreme Court added that the same applies for the plaintiff’s UM

97. Id. at 659–60.
98. Id. at 660.
99. Id. at 661.
100. Id. at 667.
101. Id. at 664.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 665.
104. Id. at 666.
105. Id. at 667.
106. Id. at 666.
107. Id. at 671. The collateral-source rule is a common law import. Id. at 667.
“Basically, the rule provides that ‘a tortfeasor may not benefit, and an injured
plaintiff’s tort recovery may not be reduced, because of monies received by the
plaintiff from sources independent of the tortfeasor’s procuration or contribution.’” Id.
(citing Bozeman v. Louisiana, 879 So. 2d 692, 698 (La. 2004)).
108. Id.
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insurer.109 That case—Cutsinger v. Redfern—had facts that were nearly
identical to Bellard.110 One major difference, however, was that the UM
policy excluded coverage to the extent that coverage would benefit any
workers’ compensation insurer.111 The Court first noted that this
“Traveler’s exclusion” was enforceable under previous Louisiana
Supreme Court jurisprudence.112 The Court then reasoned that “[t]he fact
that the uninsured motorist coverage was procured by plaintiff in this case
rather than her employer as was the case in Bellard makes no difference
in the solidarity analysis.”113 In keeping with Bellard, the Court went on
to analyze solidarity and concluded that the two were solidarily bound.114
Thus, once again, the UM insurer was entitled to a credit.115
2. Cole v. State Farm: Backing Off of Bellard and Cutsinger
In Cole v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,116 the Third
Circuit addressed facts that were similar to those in Cutsinger and Bellard,
but with two major differences: first, the workers’ compensation insurer
sought the credit from the UM insurer;117 and second, the relevant UM
policy contained a Traveler’s exclusion.118 The crux of the workers’
compensation insurer’s argument was that because the Louisiana Supreme
Court jurisprudence made clear that the two parties were solidarily bound,
basic Civil Code principles of solidarity required that either party should
be allowed a credit.119 Ultimately, the court held that the workers’
compensation insurer was not entitled to the credit.120 The court arrived at
that decision not through an analysis of solidarity, but rather by reasoning
that the policy language excluding UM coverage to the extent it benefits
the workers’ compensation insurer precludes the insurer from claiming a
credit.121
109. Cutsinger v. Redfern, 12 So. 3d 945, 955 (La. 2009).
110. See generally id.
111. Id. at 954.
112. Id. (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joseph, 656 So. 2d 1000, 1004 (La.
1995)) (“[N]o statutory provision or policy consideration precludes a UM carrier
from contracting to exclude liability for compensation reimbursement.”).
113. Id. at 951–52.
114. Id. at 953.
115. Id. at 956.
116. 149 So. 3d 831 (La. Ct. App. 2014).
117. Id. at 832.
118. Id. at 834–35.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 836.
121. Id.
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The Cole court almost entirely sidestepped the issue of solidarity,
stating only that “solidarity can be affected by contract.”122 Supporting its
decision to decide the case on policy grounds, the court cited a slew of preBellard cases upholding the Traveler’s exclusion.123 After Bellard and
Cutsinger, however, it is strange to see a lower court decide a “credit case”
without properly analyzing solidarity.
3. Olivier v. City of Eunice, Advantage Personnel, and Being
“Bound for the Same Thing”
A court’s finding of whether two obligors are bound for the same thing
may be contingent on how specifically the court chooses to describe the
obligation. In Olivier v. City of Eunice,124 the Third Circuit held that an
employer and an employee’s health insurer were bound in solido for
injuries the plaintiff sustained during his employment.125 In applying the
first prong of the Hoefly test, the court determined that both obligors were
bound for the same thing because they shared a similar purpose—to
compensate injured and ill persons.126 The court concluded that the
remaining two prongs of the Hoefly test were met without offering any
analysis.127 The court also noted in its opinion that the analysis was made
without having a copy of any insurance policy in the record.128
The Olivier court employed a high level of generality to describe the
obligations between two obligors to find solidarity. In contrast, however,
the First Circuit in Advantage Personnel and Louisiana Safety Ass’n of
Timbermen v. Van Cleave129 described two obligations with a high level
of specificity to find that two obligors were not solidarily bound.130 In
deciding that a workers’ compensation insurer and UM insurer were not
solidarily bound, the Advantage Personnel court concluded that the
workers’ compensation insurer’s obligation could not include loss of
consortium and pain because workers’ compensation does not compensate
for those damages.131
122. Id. at 835 (quoting Watson v. Funderburk, 720 So. 2d 808 (La. Ct. App.
1998), writ denied, 736 So. 2d 834 (La. 1999)).
123. Id. at 833.
124. 92 So. 3d 630 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
125. Id. at 641.
126. Id. at 639.
127. Id. at 639–40.
128. Id. at 638.
129. 146 So. 3d 221 (La. Ct. App. 2014).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 233.
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II. POSSIBLE DEFICIENCIES IN THE HOEFLY TEST
The propriety and effectiveness of the Hoefly test as a means of
determining solidarity that “arises from the law” is questionable. In
Fertitta v. Allstate,132 Louisiana’s highest court addressed the difficulty of
using a test where the elements of the test cannot be parsed from the
consequences of the test:
Perhaps the most difficult problem in solidarity cases is separating
conceptually the requirements of solidarity from the consequences of
solidarity. [The Louisiana Civil Code] set[s] forth the requirement of
solidarity that the debtors are obliged to the same thing in that each is
separately bound to perform the whole of the obligation. . . . In cases
in which solidarity results from a contract . . . the determination of
solidarity is relatively simple . . . . The difficult cases are those in
which solidarity is imposed by law on two parties with different
sources of liability, and there is a tendency to determine the existence
of solidarity by inquiring whether the consequences of solidarity
should flow from the relationship between the parties. . . . While this
may be a legitimate inquiry into whether the Legislature intended the
consequences of solidarity, discussion of the consequences as part of
the determination of the existence of solidarity has been confusing in
judicial decisions.133
Accordingly, this Section proceeds by examining post-Hoefly
jurisprudence as a means of evaluating the efficacy of the Hoefly test. A
review of this line of cases reveals that the Hoefly test suffers from a circular
analytical framework; is incompatible with previous Louisiana Supreme
Court jurisprudence; fails to serve solidarity’s original purpose; and is easily
manipulated.
A. A Circular Analytical Framework
Dissecting the analytical framework of the line of “credit” cases
reveals the circular nature of a consequences-based test. The application
of a consequences-based test has always been troublesome for Louisiana
courts, as evidenced by the dicta in Fertitta.134 What the Fertitta Court
132. 462 So. 2d 159 (La. 1985).
133. Id. at 163 n.5. Justice Blanche concurred in Fertitta. In his concurrence,
he only referred the reader to his dissent in Hoefly and his concurrence in Carona.
Id. at 165.
134. Id. at 163 n.5.
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struggled to articulate is that the Hoefly test itself suffers from a circular
analytical framework. Circular reasoning is defined as “a type of reasoning
in which the proposition is supported by the premises, which is supported
by the proposition.”135 This definition makes more sense in an illustration:
X is true because of Y, and Y is true because of X.136 A logical statement
could be similarly illustrated: X is true because of Y, and Y is true because
of Z.137
The third prong of the Hoefly test determines solidarity in part by
asking whether payment by one exonerates the others toward the
creditor.138 In the credit cases, the entire purpose of determining solidarity
was to determine if payment by one insurer exonerated the other insurer
as to the plaintiff.139 For instance, in Bellard, the Court determined that
because “payment by one exonerated the other” (X) they were solidarily
bound (Y). Thus, because they were solidarily bound (Y), payment by one
exonerated the other as toward the creditor (X).140 This classic illustration
of circular reasoning indicates that using a consequences-based test to
determine the classification of an obligation is erroneous because the
classification is important only because of its consequences. This flawed
framework implies that the Hoefly Court incorrectly applied article 1796
as the basis for its solidarity test.
Thus, to cure the logical defect of the Hoefly test, the criteria for
determining solidarity must be distinct from the consequences of
solidarity. This distinction must exist because the end result is often, as
illustrated in the insurance-credit cases,141 an application of the
consequences of solidarity. In other words, as long as there is a
consequences-based test, the test will always be circular.
B. The Problems Presented by the Traveler’s Exclusion
In addition to, or perhaps because of, the logical deficiencies of the
Hoefly test, courts have exhibited confusion in applying solidarity in the

135. Circular Reasoning, LOGICALLY FALLACIOUS, https://www.logicallyfalla
cious.com/tools/lp/Bo/LogicalFallacies/66/Circular_Reasoning [https://perma.cc/C
4D7-Q387] (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Hoefly v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575, 576 (La. 1982).
139. See discussion supra Part I.C.
140. Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 980 So. 2d 654, 666 (La. 2008).
141. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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insurance context.142 Specifically, problems arise when a UM policy
contains a provision excluding coverage to the extent it benefits any
workers’ compensation insurance company.143 Longstanding Louisiana
jurisprudence upholds these exclusions under Traveler’s, yet upholding
the exclusion runs afoul of solidarity principles.
The reasoning in Cole v. State Farm clearly illustrates this point.
Recall that this case dealt with facts similar to Bellard and Cutsinger—a
tort victim sustained injuries in a car accident during the course and scope
of employment.144 Although Bellard premised its decisions on
solidarity,145 Cole anchored its decision in terms of the language of the
applicable insurance policy.146 Curiously, Cole did not apply the Hoefly
test. Rather, the court stated only that “solidarity [can] be affected by
contract” as support for deciding the issue on policy grounds.147
This statement of law—most likely because of citation error—seems
to lack supporting legal authority. The court cited Watson, and Watson
cited Fertitta, for this proposition.148 The applicable portion of Fertitta that
found its way into Cole, however, stood only for the proposition that one
solidary obligor cannot contract with the creditor as to the effect that its
payment would have concerning the exoneration of other solidary obligors
toward the creditor.149 No such circumstances existed in Cole.
Citation errors aside, perhaps the Cole court struggled to reconcile the
operation of a Traveler’s exclusion, which excludes UM coverage to the
extent it benefits any workers’ compensation insurance company, with the
principles of solidarity. Under Bellard and Cutsinger, the UM insurer and
the workers’ compensation insurer are solidarily bound.150 Therefore,
142. See, e.g., Cole v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 149 So. 3d 831, 833,
836 (La. Ct. App. 2014); see also discussion infra Part II.B.
143. See id.
144. See Bellard, 980 So. 2d at 656; see also Cutsinger v. Redfern, 12 So. 3d
945, 946 (La. 2009); Cole, 149 So. 3d at 833, 836.
145. Bellard, 980 So. 2d at 672.
146. Cole, 149 So. 3d at 833, 836.
147. Id. at 835 (quoting Watson v. Funderburk, 720 So. 2d 808, 810 (La. Ct.
App. 1998)).
148. Id.
149. Fertitta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 462 So. 2d 159, 164 (La. 1985)
(“Nevertheless, the Civil Code expressly provides that payment by one solidary
obligor exonerates the other toward the creditor to the extent of that payment, and
the solidary obligor who makes the payment cannot by agreement with the
creditor affect the right of the other solidary obligor to exoneration to the extent
of the payment.”).
150. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1796 (2017); see also Bellard, 980 So. 2d at 667;
Cutsinger, 12 So. 3d at 952.

2017]

SOLIDARITY IN OVERLAPPING INSURANCE COVERAGE

991

under article 1796, payment by either should exonerate the other toward
the creditor, and the workers’ compensation insurer should have been
entitled to a credit.151 If the Cole court applied the rules of solidarity,
however, the application of those rules would have run afoul of Traveler’s
because it effectively renders the policy exclusion unenforceable by
allowing the workers’ compensation insurer to benefit from the UM
insurer’s payment.
It seems that the operation of the Traveler’s exclusion precludes a
finding of solidarity. Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Cutsinger
failed to make a distinction between a UM policy that has a Traveler’s
exclusion and one that does not. The Louisiana Supreme Court has long
stated that it is the coextensiveness of the obligations that bind obligors in
solido.152 And arguably, a UM policy containing a workers’ compensation
exclusion is not bound coextensively at all with a workers’ compensation
insurer. If the total liability triggering both policies never exceeds the
amount paid by workers’ compensation, the UM insurer owes nothing. In
this light, the UM insurer is bound only to the extent that the workers’
compensation insurer is not.
C. The Test No Longer Serves its Original Purpose
Many scholars suggest it was misguided to adopt such a liberal view
of solidarity arising from the law, and a plain reading of the Code forced
the courts’ hands to avoid harsh results following from a strict application
of solidarity.153 Thus, an expansive view of solidarity arising from the law
was necessary to promote tort recovery and the free flow of credit, which
are the reasons Louisiana instituted solidarity.154 A liberal view of
solidarity—such as the Hoefly test—is no longer necessary address those
concerns, however.
One way that solidarity promoted tort recovery—a reason that likely
influenced the Court’s decision in Hoefly—was the entanglement of
solidarity with liberative prescription. The Court in Hoefly needed to find
solidarity to save a plaintiff’s claim.155 The 1988 revision to Civil Code
article 2324 adding that interruption of prescription as to one joint

151. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1796; see also Bellard, 980 So. 2d at 667; Cutsinger,
12 So. 3d at 952.
152. Narcise v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 427 So. 2d 1192, 1195 (La. 1983).
153. See, e.g., Patricia Wiener, Obligations—Uninsured Motorist and Insurer
as Obligors In Solido, 58 TUL. L. REV. 642, 658–59 (1983).
154. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.66, at 149.
155. Hoefly v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575, 576 (La. 1982).
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tortfeasor interrupts as to others,156 however, diminished the need for
solidarity to aid in tort recovery.
Similarly, a broad interpretation of solidarity arising from the law is
not needed to facilitate the free flow of credit. The law presumes that
creditors are generally sophisticated and are capable of contracting for
solidarity.157 The lobby for creditors—such as banks—is persuasive
enough that now, the most prolific source of solidarity in legislation can
be found in the law of negotiable instruments.158 Insurers can also avail
themselves of policy exclusions such as the Traveler’s exclusion that was
dispositive in Cole.
D. Prong One of the Hoefly Test is Easily Manipulated
The first prong of the principal-effects test, which asks whether each
obligor is obligated for the same thing, is also flawed. In constitutional
law, ample literature discusses the concept referred to as “levels of
generality.”159 Simply put, the more generally a court describes two things,
the more similar those two things appear.160 Conversely, the more
specifically two things are described, the more different they appear.161
Courts, perhaps unwittingly, use this technique to manipulate the Hoefly
test.

156. Act No. 430, 1988 La. Acts 932.
157. See Sec. First Nat’l Bank v. Murchison, 739 So. 2d 803, 807 (La. Ct. App.
1999); see also GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 33.03, in 8 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 104 (1999).
158. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 10:1-101 to 10:1-103, 10:3-112, 10:3-114, 10:3116, 10:3-413 to 10:3-415, 10:3-417 (2017); see also LITVINOFF, supra note 10, §
7.66, at 149 (“Be that as it may, legal solidarity does not arise only from articles
in the civil code. Among the other laws that address the same subject, the most
prolific source of solidarity for multiple obligors is, perhaps, the law of negotiable
instruments.”).
159. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (“The question then
becomes: at what level of generality should the Court describe the right
previously protected and the right currently claimed? The more abstractly one
states the already-protected right, the more likely it becomes that the claimed right
will fall within its protection. For instance, did the Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut recognize the narrow right to use contraception or the broader right
to make a variety of procreative decisions? Obviously, the descriptive choice will
affect the Court’s decisions in other cases, such as those involving abortion.”).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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For instance, in Olivier v. City of Eunice,162 without having the
insurance policies on record, the Third Circuit held that a workers’
compensation insurer and a health insurance provider were solidarily
liable.163 The court, utilizing a high level of generality, concluded that the
“general purpose” of both types of coverage were the same; thus both were
bound for the same thing.164 In Advantage Personnel v. Van Cleave, the
First Circuit concluded that a workers’ compensation insurer was not
solidarily liable with a liability insurer for the plaintiff’s loss of consortium
and pain and suffering damages.165 Utilizing a high level of specificity, the
court described the workers’ compensation obligation as only including
compensation for medical bills and lost wages—not loss of consortium or
pain and suffering.166 The court concluded that the liability insurer’s
obligation did include compensation for loss of consortium and pain and
suffering.167 Therefore, the two insurers were not obligated for the same
thing.168 Compared to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s description of a
workers’ compensation insurer’s obligation as for “certain elements of tort
damage,”169 it is easy to see how the manipulation of levels of generality
used to describe an obligation can influence a court’s analysis of the first
prong of the Hoefly test. A more cynical view of this technique’s
application might lead the reader to conclude that it allows a court to reach
162. 92 So. 3d 630 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
163. Id. at 639.
164. Id. (“In Bellard and Cutsinger, the obligations of UM insurers and
workers’ compensation insurers were at issue, and to the extent that their
obligations to the plaintiff employees overlapped, they were found to be obliged
for the same thing. The obligations of health insurers and employers or workers’
compensation insurers are similar to, but not the same as, those of UM insurers
and workers’ compensation insurers. The central purpose of workers’
compensation insurance and health insurance is protection of an injured or ill
person. The WCA protects the person when his injury or illness is related to his
employment. Health insurance protects the person in all situations when he is
injured or ill. For these reasons, we find the City and Blue Cross are obliged for
the same thing.”).
165. 146 So. 3d 221, 231 (La. Ct. App. 2014).
166. Id. at 233.
167. Id.
168. Id. (“The workers’ compensation insurer and UM insurer are solidary
obligors only to the extent that their obligations are co-extensive for lost wages
and medical expenses . . . . The insurers are not solidary obligors for other
damages, such as pain and suffering or loss of consortium, because the workers’
compensation insurer has no liability for those damages under the exclusive
remedy provision of the workers' compensation act.”).
169. Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 980 So. 2d 654, 664 (La. 2008).
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any conclusion it desires. Perhaps this illustration of the Hoefly test’s
malleability is what Justice Blanche had in mind when he characterized
the Hoefly test as “judicial legislation.”170
III. A SIMPLE SOLUTION—RETURNING TO BASIC
CIVIL CODE PRINCIPLES
The doctrine surrounding the determination of solidarity arising from
the law has become untenable in Louisiana. And this particular issue is not
peculiar to Louisiana. In fact, the Louisiana Civil Law Treatise recognizes
that, faced with analogous problems,171 French courts have turned to
solidarité coutumière or “solidarity custom.”172 There, the courts ask if
two particular obligors have been historically treated as solidary.173 Other
Civil Code principles, however, may also provide guidance.
Louisiana should return to a test for solidarity that recognizes, as
Justice Blanche did, that solidarity is an exception to the general rule.174
The general rule should remain what the drafters of the Code intended:
except where parties contract for solidarity, it should arise only from a
clear expression from legislation. As Justice Blanche noted, whether
solidarity has arisen from the law is an issue of legislative intent that must
be viewed in light of the presumption against solidarity.175
There may be unforeseeable instances that call for an exception. In
such a rare case, an exception must be applied only in light of the purposes
for which France and Louisiana have adopted solidarity: tort recovery and
the flow of credit.176 As an additional restriction on this exception to the
general rule, courts may adopt France’s solution by testing for whether the
two obligors have been treated as solidary.177 That is, there must “exist[]

170. See Hoefly v. Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575, 581 (La. 1982)
(Blanche, J., dissenting) (“A solidary relationship between the uninsured motorist
carrier and the tortfeasor does not exist by virtue of some provision of the law;
rather, it is purely the creation of the majority opinion. Such judicial legislation is
beyond the bounds of our authority. By the express provisions of C.C. art. 2093,
we cannot presume a solidary relationship where none is intended to exist.”).
171. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.66, at 149.
172. 7 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANÇAIS 430–33 (2d ed. 1954).
173. Id.
174. See Carona v. State Farm. Ins. Co., 458 So. 2d 1275, 1280 (La. 1984)
(Blanche, J., concurring).
175. Hoefly, 418 So. 2d at 581 (Blanche, J., dissenting).
176. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.66, at 149.
177. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 172, at 430–33.
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some relationship between the parties who are held solidarily liable.”178 In
addition to comporting with an everyday common sense notion of fairness,
this test aligns itself with the most basic of Civil Code principles. This
notion of custom, though seldom applied, is the most basic of civilian
principles derived from the Civil Code’s first article: “The sources of law
are legislation and custom.”179 Embedded in this inquiry of custom—
which asks if the obligors have traditionally been treated as solidary—is
the concept of the “relationship” that concerned Justice Blanche. Whether
from contract or legislation, a solidary relationship cannot be presumed
where none was intended to exist.180
CONCLUSION
Louisiana courts must return to a more restrained view of solidarity
arising from the law. The Hoefly test as illustrated in the context of
overlapping insurance coverage cases is simply no longer tenable. Indeed,
it may be that it never was. As the Hoefly test has expanded, Justice
Blanche’s emphatic dissent in Hoefly now seems prophetic: solidarity is a
legal relationship best prescribed by the legislature. When legislated, the
results would be predictable, and defendants in tort suits would be put on
notice of the existence of their relationship to one another. In the rare
instances where courts may apply an exception, the use of this exception
should be restrained by the public policy goals of tort recovery and flow
of credit and should only be applied where the obligors have historically
been treated as solidary.

178. Hoefly, 418 So. 2d at 581 (Blanche, J., dissenting).
179. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2017).
180. Hoefly, 418 So. 2d at 581 (Blanche, J., dissenting).

